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Despite having been candidates for the next banking crises to come over the last
couple of years, the reform states of Eastern Europe seem thus far to have done remarkably
well in avoiding major financial collapses. Banking distress has in most cases not yet turned
into banking crisis. These supposed successes, however, have only come at the cost of state
intervention in the financial systems which often took the form of ad hoc rescue operations
rather than being part of a coherent overall reform package. Although the problem of non-
performing loans on the balance sheets of Eastern European banks is far from being resolved,
first signs indicate that at least some banks are transforming into risk-cautious lending insti-
tutions. Many successor states of the Soviet Union, in contrast, have not yet started to restruc-
ture their banking systems. Often, structural problems remain covered by negative real
interest rates and by a flow of direct and indirect subsidies to firms.
This paper intends to serve two main purposes. First, it analyzes the different strate-
gies that have been implemented by the reform states of Eastern Europe in order to avoid
large-scale banking failure. Secondly, the paper gives some outlook as to the perspectives of
financial market development in the more advanced reform states. The major findings of the
paper are that the stock problem of inherited bad debt has already been dealt with in the more
advanced reform states. Future bail-outs would thus entail severe moral hazard problems.
Nevertheless, the danger of large-scale banking crises has not yet been removed from Eastern
Europe. Especially as banks gain strength and expand their operations into new business ac-
tivities, banking risks will increase, and the implementation of tight prudential regulations
through a functioning banking supervision becomes key. In less advanced economies, es-
pecially in parts of the former Soviet Union, an efficient financial and banking sector can
only emerge if banks are no longer used as agents of the Ministry of Finance that channel
cheap credits to preferred sectors of the economy. As part of an encompassing reform pro-
gram in these states, banks should be recapitalized for the stock of non-performing loans
which results from this form of indirect subsidization. Such a recapitalization program must
be closely tight to the privatization of banks and may, for an interim period, comprise ceilings
on loans from state-owned banks to state-owned enterprises.
The paper proceeds as follows. The second part reviews the potential causes for
banking crises and assesses the situation of the banking systems in the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, and Poland. The third part gives an overview over policy measures that can be
implemented in order to contain the stock as well as the flow problem of non-performing
loans and analyzes the measures that have already been implemented in this regard by the
four countries. The fourth part concludes.n. Banking Crisis vs. Banking Distress
1. Conceptual Notes
Banking crises can have liquidity or solvency problems as underlying causes which,
albeit being closely related, should be strictly separated. Because banks finance long-term
assets with short-term liabilities, they run into liquidity problems as soon as they cannot easily
refinance short-term deposits that are being withdrawn in an unforseable way. This can be
shown upon inspection of a bank's balance sheet restriction [Baltensperger/Milde, 1987]:
(1) R + L = D + E
where R = (liquid) reserves, L = (illiquid) loans, D = deposits, and E = equity. As soon as
stochastic withdrawals of deposits (W) exceed the amount of reserves, the bank is illiquid and
may have to borrow additional liquidity at the Central Bank at an interest rate r
p:
(2) W>R => X = r
p(W-R)
where X = liquidity costs as a function of reserves and deposits. Hence, banks which are
facing liquidity problems may turn to the central bank as a lender-of-last-resort or use its dis-
count window.
1 As an alternative to borrowing with the Central Bank, maturity risks can be
managed by taking recourse to inter-bank money markets as long as the solvency of the bank
is not being questioned.
2 On these markets, other banks offer their excess liquidity at a mar-
ket interest rate.
In developed market economies where liquid inter-bank markets exist and where
assets which might serve as collateral for central bank refinancing are available, pure liquidity
problems of banks are rarely a major concern. In the emerging market economies, however,
where neither of these conditions is met, liquidity problems may actually suffice to put the
overall viability of a bank at risk. This holds in particular because bankers are inexperienced
with maturity management. In such a situation, a bank run is individually rational although it
may be collectively irrational [Baltensperger/Dermine, 1992, p. 279]. If depositors expect the
bank to become illiquid in the future, it is rational for each depositor to try and be the first to
1 In Estonia, where the central bank does not offer such services, the question of how to
prevent liquidity crises from causing banking crises is of special importance. Hence, the
central bank requires commercial banks to hold fairly large required reserves on which
they can draw as emergency credits [see part HI.3].
2 One solution to liquidity problems could be to sell part of the bank's assets and to use the
sales proceeds to pay off depositors. An immediate sale of the bank's assets may, however,
yield less than the book value of the assets. This is the case if the value of the banks' assets
contains some bank-specific information that is not easily verifiable to outside investors.withdraw his or her deposit. From a collective point of view, however, such a bank run is
irrational since it puts the viability of the bank or even of the banking system
3 at risk.
Despite the importance of liquidity problems of banks in Eastern Europe, this paper
will focus on solvency issues which relate to the quality of the bank's assets and thus to the
credit risk that a bank faces. Insolvency is defined as a situation in which the expected return
does not suffice to cover costs or
(3) (l + [i




D)= expected interest rates on loans (deposits), and K = operating costs.
4 The
bank's expected profits (7t) thus become
(4) 7i = [i
L L~\i
D D-K(L,D)-X(R,D)-Y(L,D)-pE
with Y = insolvency costs which can be interpreted as the costs of restructuring the bank's as-
set portfolio or of negotiating with its debtors, and p = opportunity costs of holding equity.
Even if the maturity structures of assets and liabilities perfectly match, the bank may recover
less than a dollar on each dollar lend and may thus not be able to fully repay its depositors
because of the stochastic nature of the lending rate. Again, a bank-run is the likely outcome
because depositors who start to doubt the quality of the bank's assets will find it rational to be
the first to liquidate their deposits.
A banking crisis in this paper will be defined along the lines proposed by
Sundararajan and Balino as "a situation in which a significant group of financial institutions
have liabilities exceeding the market value of their assets, leading to runs and other portfolio
shifts, collapse of some financial firms, and government intervention." [Sundararajan/Balino,
1991, p. 3] A banking crisis describes therefore a situation in which banks are both, insolvent
and illiquid. The portfolio shifts which a banking crisis sets into motion are typically reflected
in a rising ratio of currency-to-deposits [Brunner/Meltzer, 1988, p. 447] and thus in a
contraction of money supply.
5 The likely increase in real interest rates is one channel through
which a banking crisis may have negative feedback effects on the real sector. Mishkin [1992,
1994] offers a different interpretation of a .financial crisis which addresses the causes of
banking failures. He defines a financial crisis as a situation where a disruption of financial
3 This is the case if, due to incomplete information, bad news about one bank are interpreted
as bad news about other banks of similar structure.
4 Hence, in a one-period model, illiquidity may be interpreted as the inability to service
depositors during the period while insolvency relates to the value of assets and liabilities at
the end of the period.
5 Note that nothing has been said so far about the desirability of government intervention to
alleviate the crisis. This, as will be discussed below, depends on the causes of the crisis.markets leads to increased adverse selection and moral hazard. Although this definition is
somewhat hard to apply to Eastern Europe because of the lack of a reference scheme,
Mishkin also notes that financial crises may not necessarily be associated with bank runs but
are most likely to start with an increase in interest rates, a fall in stock market prices, or an
increase in uncertainty.
The above definition distinguishes a banking crises from a situation of banking
distress which is characterized by banks which are insolvent but not illiquid
[Sundararajan/Balino, 1991], Financial distress, as will be shown below, characterizes the
situation of many Eastern European banks. Such a situation can occur if the bank is able to
pay out depositors by attracting new deposits [Calvo/Kumar, 1994, pp. 13]. If, at the end of
the period, the depositors of this period liquidate their deposits, they are not being repaid
from the return on lending but from new deposits. Hence, for this mechanism to be sus-
tainable, demand for deposits must remain constant (at zero interest rates on deposits) or may
even have to increase (at positive deposit rates). As this increase in money demand is unlikely
to occur in a situation in which banks are known to be insolvent
6, it seems more reasonable to
assume that the Central Banks provides timely liquidity assistance to insolvent banks such
that these can meet their current commitments.
7 This reasoning also indicates that banking
distress is likely to turn into a banking crisis if either the deposit base stops to increase be-
cause, for example, an implicit deposit insurance scheme is terminated, or if the Central Bank
becomes more selective and does not refinance insolvent banks anymore.
Poor asset quality as the underlying source of financial distress and crisis can have dif-
ferent potential causes. First, many banking crises that have occurred in developed market
economies were caused by a deterioration of the value of assets which served as collateral for
a loan. Hence, falling asset prices are often one major underlying factor to banking crises.
8
This asset price deflation has a direct effect on the value of the bank as the value of its asset
holdings declines. Falling asset prices also have an indirect, and probably more significant,
impact on the solvency of banks as they reduce the value of loan collateral. Secondly, the
higher and more volatile real interest rates, the more likely is borrower distress. This, in turn,
depends on the relative movements of individual sector's prices as well as on the flexibility of
6 Money supply may also increase during the transformation process as households increase
their savings.
7 At least for Poland, there is evidence that insolvent banks have been kept afloat through
cheap refinancing facilities of the Central Bank [Pawlowicz et al., 1994, p. 59]. Csaki
[1994, p. 26] also cites the case of two small Hungarian banks which the Central Bank
intends to refinance until their financial position has strengthened. The refinancing policy
is thus discretionary as, in general, the Hungarian Central Bank started to charge penalty
rates for the refinancing of insolvent banks in 1990 [Szanyi, 1993],
8 Gem [1993, pp. 61] cites evidence for the case of Japan where, due to the collapse of the
stock market and a fall in real estate prices, non-performing loans in commercial banks
reached up to 10 percent of total loans.nominal interest rates. Thirdly, inappropriate wage policies regime may endanger the profi-
tability of the domestic industry. If nominal domestic wages are downward sticky, domestic
inflation may lead to real exchange rate appreciation and thus prove detrimental for the com-
petitiveness of the domestic tradables sector. This danger is in particularly pronounced in
those countries which have adopted a fixed exchange rate regimes such as Estonia or the
Czech Republic. Fourth, the higher the leverage ratio and thus the dependence of the do-
mestic industry on external finance, the more likely is real sector adjustment to have negative
feedback effects into the financial sector. 9 Generally, there are three factors that tend to
aggravate financial crisis: (i) shifts in relative prices, (ii) interest rate deregulation and other
financial liberalization measures prior to or during the crisis, (iii) weakness in enforcing pru-
dential regulations or poor regulations as such [Sundararajan/Balino, 1991, p. 8].
The emerging market economies have a number of features in common with those
countries where banking crises have occurred. The causes of the financial distress of banks in
Eastern Europe and of the imminent crises can broadly be divided into factors that are exter-
nal or internal, respectively, to the banking system. The external factors are those related to
the overall transformation process which rendered many previous loan recipients insolvent.
Bad debt on the balance sheets of banks, at least in the beginning of the transformation pro-
cess, reflects the inefficiencies with which financial funds were allocated under central plan-
ning (stock problem). In the socialist system, loans were typically granted in accordance with
the requirements of the central production plan, regardless of solvency or liquidity criteria. A
proper assessment of credit risk was thus not required [Garvey, 1966]. In this sense, financial
distress is the reflection of the transformation process and of the drastic changes in relative
prices associated with it. In addition, the effectiveness with which bankruptcy laws are im-
plemented determines over the size of spill-over effects from the real to the financial sector.
The internal factors result from the liberalization of the banking system itself. First of all, by
carving the new commercial banks out of the old monobank-system without giving them an
adequate equity base, the foundation for a future crisis was laid. Also, financial liberalization
created a new institutional framework for the operation of banks which was often inconsistent
and incomplete. Banks were allowed to attract new customers, to expand into new areas of
business, and to offer new products without being placed into an adequate regulatory
framework.
In this situation, there are three main reasons why the government may have to inter-
vene in the banking system. First, the presence of a stock of non-performing loans has
detrimental consequences for the efficiency of financial resource allocation. Banks burdened
with non-performing loans tend to bias lending towards their traditional clients, hence having
9 This is not to say that causality runs form the real to the financial sector only. Schiantarelli
et al. [1994], for example, show that financial sector reform has positive implications for
the real economy.less funds available for lending to the newly emerging private sector. ^ By lending to their
old clients, banks maintain a residual claim on these enterprises' profits. The banks have thus
a chance to recover previous loan losses.
1
1 Hence, distress lending as well as improper risk
assessment lead to a substantial flow problem of non-performing loans. As this mechanism
also applies to private banks, the stock problem should be solved prior to privatization in
order to prevent a continuing misallocation of resources. As a matter of fact, the presence of
bad debt on the balance sheets of banks can serve as an argument against bank privatization.
Bank privatization prior to recapitalization may raise expectations of a potential future bail-
out of these banks. In addition, the greater the stock of bad debt and thus the worse the
structure of the existing clients of a bank, the greater are the potential lending risks of new
loans. Banks have therefore an incentive to raise lending rates and interest rates spreads as a
cushion against loan losses. This strategy, however, causes problems of adverse selection. If
information on project risks is asymmetrically distributed between borrowers and lenders,
banks may choose not to raise interest rates but to ration credit in order to avoid a
deterioration of the pool of loan applicants [Stiglitz/Weiss, 1981]. Again, private enterprises
may be more seriously credit rationed than old, state-owned enterprises because information
on new firms is particularly scarce [Buch, 1994].
The misallocation of financial resources caused by a stock of bad debt is one main
reason for government intervention that relieves banks off their burden of non-performing
loans. This efficiency argument for bank recapitalization holds in principle for both, old as
well as newly accumulated stocks of bad debt. There is, however, also a moral hazard argu-
ment which should caution against a bail-out for newly accumulated bad debt. A government
bail-out can be more reasonably be justified as a one-time, non-recurring event if only loans
which commercial banks inherited from the past are the subject of bank recapitalization. In
cases when deliberate asset mis-management through the owners of banks is the source of
poor asset quality will a bail-out entail severe moral hazard problems. In other words, not the
presence of a stock of bad debt as such justifies government intervention but rather its origin
as a reflection of past legacies does.
Secondly, apart from the efficiency argument, the protection of depositors' wealth
justifies banks' solvency to be restored. Unsound lending policies put the deposits of the
1
0 Calvo and Kumar [1994] as well as Gomulka [1993] also argue that the weakness of banks'
loan portfolios can be hold responsible for increased bank lending to the government and
thus for a crowding out of private sector investment.
1
1 This argument has been formalized by Perotti [1993a]. For a related reasoning see Mohr
[1991]. Perotti [1993b] argues that the main reason for credit roll-over is the presence of a
deposit insurance system which protects the bank from assuming risks as well as a highly
concentrated lending portfolios. Credit roll-over and distress lending can thus be explained
endogenously without taking recourse to the assumption that banks follow politically
motivated lending strategies or that close personal contacts between bank and enterprise
managers determine the allocation of loans.population at risk. This concern can be eliminated if depositors are assumed to have complete
information about the lending policies of the banks. They can then demand a risk premium,
causing positive insolvency costs for the bank. In the emerging market economies, however,
do neither depositors have the expertise to assess the quality of a bank nor do banks are
having a reliable record of past performance. Incomplete information on the bank's lending
portfolios is thus prevailing.
1
2 This argument strengthens even further if one considers that
under central planning depositors were typically constrained regarding the choice of their
bank and that interest rates were controlled. Hence, the decision to hold a deposit with a cer-
tain bank at a certain interest rate was all but voluntary.
Thirdly, in addition to the adverse effects that bank insolvencies can have on the effi-
ciency of resource allocation, banking distress also has negative implications for the conduct
of monetary and fiscal policies. To the extent that the Central Bank tries to counteract banks'
solvency problems by injecting liquidity into the banking system, it may loose control over
monetary policy. Once the banking crisis is anticipated or has even occurred, significant port-
folio re-allocations set in which tend to complicate monetary fine-tuning even further. A fi-
nancial crisis also causes substantial costs to the central budget and/or to the Central Bank.
These costs may actually rise over time as distress iending contributes to a continued mis-al-
location of resources. Hence, the soundness of the banking and financial system are important
components of a successful stabilization-cum-liberalization package.
1
2 Note that this argument also has an efficiency component. If the trust of depositors in the
domestic banking system is severely destroyed through a banking crisis, depositors may
decide to reduce their financial savings. This may leave the economy with insufficient
funds for investments. An additional argument for the protection of depositors interests is
that, during the periods of negative interest rates, they have already provided a net transfer
to the holders of debt obligations [Bennett/Schadler, 1993].10
2. Empirical Evidence from Eastern Europe
Based on the definition outlined above, a banking crisis is characterized by (i) a sig-
nificant group of financial institutions with negative net worth and (ii) an increase in the cur-
rency-to-deposit ratio; Because risk-adjusted, disaggregated balance sheet data from Eastern
European banks is not available, we will use the overall share of non-performing loans on the
balance sheet of banks as well as the capital-asset-ratios of selected banks as proxies for the
net-worth of banks. In order to take changes in the creation of reserves by banks into account,
the currency-to-deposit ratio is replaced by the money multiplier (m):
\ + c
(5) M = mH m = —- r,c<\
r + c
where M = money supply, H = base money, c = currency / deposits, r = reserves / deposits.
This money multiplier decreases as the currency-to-deposit ratio increases. During the trans-
formation process, one would - in the medium- to long-run - expect the currency-to-deposit
ratio to decline (and thus the money multiplier to increase) for three reasons. First, the market
participants have to hold less precautionary balances for unexpected purchases or for black
market transactions. Secondly, the establishment of positive real interest rates should induce
households and firms to economize on their transaction balances and to invest into interest-
bearing financial assets. Thirdly, the modernization of payments techniques should lead to an
increase in non-cash transactions and thus reduce cash balances. An increase in the currency-
to-deposit and, cet. par., a decrease in the money multiplier therefore indicates a portfolio re-





At least on paper, banks in Eastern Europe had virtually no non-performing loans on
their balance sheets at the beginning of the transformation process. This was primarily the re-
sult of poor risk assessment techniques and insufficient reporting requirements in the socialist
banking system rather than a reflection of the true size of the problem. As a response to the
introduction of better reporting requirements and of an improved bankruptcy legislation, the
amount of bad loans that banks reported to carry on their balance sheets virtually exploded.
At the same time, the economic viability of many previous loan recipients seriously deterio-
rated.
Even though data on the quality of banks' loan portfolios should be treated with ex-
treme caution because of the yet insufficient reporting systems, some evidence on the relative
performance of the Eastern European reform states is available. In the Czech Republic only
See Table 1 for a summary of the data presented.11
three commercial banks inherited the assets and liabilities of the former monobank. Among
the assets of these newly created banks were low-interest rate credits which had been, granted
previously to finance inventories of the state-owned firms. These credits, amounting to 35
percent of all bank credit at the end of 1991, were likely to yield substantial losses to the
banks which, in addition, were capitalized only by the amount of 1-1.5 percent of their assets
[OECD, 1993]. According to officially recorded data, however, classified loans accounted
only for 2.4 percent of the loan portfolio of commercial banks in 1991. In 1992, primarily as
a response to new accounting and auditing requirements, this ratio jumped up to 18.96 per-
cent. Since then, the share of classified loans has been gradually increasing, albeit at a signifi-
cantly lower pace, to 23.77 percent at the end of 1993.
1
4 The problem appears to be of a
similar order of magnitude if one looks at the share of non-performing loans in overall do-
mestic credit [Table 1]. This reflects the fact that the major share of domestic lending is being
done by commercial banks.
Along with the increase of the overall amount of classified debt in the Czech Repu-
blic, two further observation can be made. First, the share of short-term non-performing debt
which accounted for 97 percent of all overdue debt at the end of 1991 has steadily been
falling to 56 percent at the end of 1993. Secondly, non-performing loans in the Czech Repu-
blic are increasingly concentrated in the private sector. While at the end of 1992 private sec-
tor loans were only half as likely to become non-performing than loans to state-owned enter-
prises, this marked difference had almost disappeared by the end of 1993 [Hrncir, 1994,
p. 12]. In principle, the failure of new enterprises should not be surprising in the context of a
developing economy. The above observation should yet be taken seriously. The high share of
private sector credit in overall non-performing loans indicates that poor management skills of
bankers and not the past misallocation of resources are responsible for the troublesome len-
ding portfolios of many, banks.
]
 5
In Estonia, the share of overdue loans as a percentage of total loans granted by com-
mercial banks has hardly surpassed the 10 percent threshold since the beginning of 1993. In
early 1994, the share has even been falling as a response to a new requirement to write off
loans which have been overdue for more than 150 days. In relation to GDP, non-performing




4 It should also be noted that the low share of non-performing loans in 1991 is also the result
of the bank recapitalization that has taken place in former Czechoslovakia in that same
year.
1
5 The observed development can also be interpreted as a lack of effective banking
supervision. Intensified audits of Czech banks in early 1994 revealed that at least 10 banks
failed to meet their minimum capital and capital-adequacy requirements [Czech Business
Update, 1994, p. 561].
1
6 This is also the result of the small size of the financial system with respect to total GDP.
While both, the share of bank loans to GDP as well as the share of M2 in GDP rose12
This apparently superior performance of the Estonian banks in terms of risk assessment must,
however, be seen against the background that the numbers which are being reported in
Table 1 do not reflect the situation which led to the Estonian banking crisis of 1992. At the
time of that crisis, one bank which had about 30 percent of non-performing loans in its
portfolio was closed and two others were merged. The latter two banks held frozen assets
with Russian banks at the amount of two thirds of total assets. Altogether, the banking crisis
affected banks which had about 30 percent of total money supply on their books in November
1992 [Sutt, 1994]. Despite these major disruptions in the financial system, the Estonian
banking system is gradually recovering. The largest banks appear well-capitalized with a ratio
of 12.75 percent of total capital-to-credits and of 4.56 percent of capital-to-assets in the
second quarter of 1993. Both ratios had increased as compared to the previous quarter.
1
7 By
February 1994, the commercial banks had reduced, both, their solvency as well as their
liquidity ratios, yet keeping them well above the requirements of the Central Bank [Eesti
Pank, 1994, p. 37]. When analyzing this data, however, it must be stressed that accounting
rules in Estonia do not yet conform to international standards. Hence, the capital of banks' is
likely to be overstated and, therefore, solvency appears more favorable than it truely is
[Hansson, 1994, p. 3].
In Hungary, there are three banks to which the stock of bad debt inherited from the
socialist regimes was allocated. At the end of 1992, these banks ranged under the five largest
Hungarian banks in terms of total assets. Two of them reported substantial losses while in
1991 only one of them incurred a negative profit [The Banker, 1992, 1993]. Throughout the
1987-to-1989 period, the major share of bad debt was concentrated in these large banks.
Since 1990, however, the situation has changed substantially, as small and mid-sized banks
had almost half of the non-performing loans of the banking system on their books [OECD,
1993, p. 62]. Generally, non-performing loans as a percentage of commercial banks' loan
portfolios increased sharply since the inception of economic reforms. The share of classified
debt in total loans granted by commercial banks was 21.46 percent in 1992 (1990: 4.36
percent). If the effects of the loan consolidation scheme which was implemented in 1992 and
1993 are taken into account, this share lowers to 15.27 percent. The share of classified debt
appears markedly lower if one looks at non-performing loans as a percentage of total
domestic credit. The reason is that, in contrast to the Czech and the Estonian case, the
Hungarian Central Bank lends significant funds to the government such that the amount of
domestic credit exceeds commercial bank lending substantially. In addition, as domestic
credit data has also been available for 1993, it becomes evident that the positive effect which
slightly in 1993, these shares were only 14.57 and 28.86 percent, respectively, at the end
of the year [Eesti Pank; own calculations].
1
7 This data is based on internal documents of the Estonian Savings Bank and covers the
seven largest Estonian banks.41$ Instituts fur Weitwbfsch€$
credit consolidation had on the solvency of banks was only a temporary one because the share
of classified debt already approached its pre-consolidation level.
Among the early reform countries of Eastern Europe, Poland obviously has the worst
track record as far as non-performing loans relative to banks' lending portfolios are con-
cerned. The problem of inherited debt in Poland is concentrated in the nine regional branches
which where carved out of the monobank in 1989. These banks also inherited the task of fi-
nancing major infrastructure projects. As a result, 6 out of the 9 banks reported negative net
assets in 1993. Overall, more than one third of all loans granted by commercial banks was re-
ported to be below average at that time. Loans to private enterprises seem to be more likely to
turn out non-performing than loans to state-owned enterprises. At the end of March 1994, the
share of overdue interest in total loans was 12.59 percent in the private and 9.5 percent in the
state-owned sector. This difference has been a common trend since the end of 1992 when
comparable data was reported for the first time by the Polish National Bank.
1
8 As in the case
of Hungary, classified debt seems to be less of a problem if domestic credit is used as a basis
of reference. This can be explained by the on-going domestic lending activities of the Polish
Central Bank. Two modifications to the apparently poor state of the Polish financial system
are in order. First, the data for 1993 does not yet take into account the effects of the Polish
recapitalization program of 1992 because banks only had to register loans to be included in
the program by March 1994. Assuming that the total amount of recapitalization (21 trillion
zloty) is used for the write-off of loans, this recapitalization would actually lower the share of
bad debt in total loans to about 24 percent which is still comparatively high. Secondly, the
overall size of the Polish banking system with respect to GDP is much smaller than the size of
the Czech or the Hungarian banking system [Buch et al., 1994]. Hence, the share of non-
performing loans in total GDP is only in the range of 5-6 percent in the Polish economy
-(1992-93), whereas non-performing loans amount to almost 18 percent in the Czech Republic
(1993). The Hungarian case lies somewhat in between with a share of classified debt in GDP
of 7-9 percent in 1992.
This information is based on unpublished documents of the National Bank of Poland.Table 1:
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Classified Loans as a Percentage of Total Loans, Domestic Credit, and GDP,
1990-1993.
| 1990 1991 1992 1993
































































a) Loans granted by commercial banks to enterprises, households, and to the government.
b) Aggregated domestic credit from the monetary survey.
c) After credit consolidation.
d) Stock data as of March 1993, flow data for 1993. After bank recapitalization.
e) Estimate.
f) Data for former Czechoslovakia.
g) Data as of February 1993. Domestic credit = net of government deposits.





As regards the development of the money multiplier, the data indicates the occurrence
of a banking crisis only in the case of Estonia. Here, the money multiplier decreased sharply
from a value of 2 in November 1992 to about 1.3 in February 1993, i.e. after the moratoria on
three large banks were declared. During 1993, the Estonian money multiplier recovered
somewhat to 1.56 in March 1994 but remained fairly low as compared to, for example, Po-
land. Here, the multiplier showed a downward trend in 1990 which, however, is more likely
1
9 See Graph 1 in the appendix.15
to be the effect of highly negative real interest rates in this period rather than the result of
growing concerns about the stability of the banking system. In 1991, the multiplier rose to
fairly high values of 5 on average but dropped sharply at the end of that year. This change,
which is primarily the result of an increase in the reserve holding of banks, may be inter-
preted as the result of bad news after Polish banks were audited by Western experts
[Pawlowicz, 1994, p. 21]. In 1992 and 1993, the money multiplier began to rise in response
to lower reserve holdings of the commercial banks with the Central Bank. The currency-to-
deposit-ratio showed a more modest decline in this period. Overall, there is no indication of a
bank run in Poland.
Similarly in Hungary, tighter regulations that were imposed on banks in 1992 did not
lead to any run on the banking system. The currency-to-deposit ratio remained fairly flat in
1992 and even declined somewhat as compared to 1991. As banks lowered their reserve posi-
tion with the central bank, the money multiplier - after having declined continuously in 1990
and 1991 - even increased in 1992 despite the growing problems in the Hungarian banking
system. Although this issue certainly warrants closer inspection, market participants seemed
to have expected the government to bail out commercial banks [Mizsei, 1994, p. 7]. Only in
mid-1993, when the ineffectiveness of the recapitalization program became obvious, did the
money multiplier decline. This decline was primarily driven by an increase in the currency-
to-deposit ratio. A further interpretation of this development is that the system of automatic
public deposit insurance was abandoned at this time [Cs&ki, 1994] and that depositors may
have become more risk-aware. The development in the Czech Republic is overshadowed by
the impact of the separation from Slovakia. In January 1993, the currency-ratio - and with it
the money multiplier - declined sharply which may be interpreted as a shift in to foreign cur-
rency holdings due to increased uncertainty. Hence, the subsequent increase in the money
multiplier ratio should be taken as an adjustment to pre-separation levels rather than as an in-
dicator of a banking crisis.
Despite growing financial distress of commercial banks in Eastern Europe as evi-
denced by the sharp increase of bad assets, only Estonia has thus far experienced a banking
crisis. In none of the other countries did significant changes in the money multiplier and the
currency-to-deposit ratios occur. To confirm this statement, two further indicators can be
considered. The first if the monthly growth rate of reserve money. Banks can be expected to
increase their reserves as they foresee financial problems, and they would run down their re-
serves in the event of a bank run. Except for the case of Estonia where banks' reserves
showed significant swings at the time of the crisis, there is hardly any evidence for changes in
bank reserves in Hungary and Poland which cannot primarily be explained by cyclical fac-
tors. A second indicator for the occurrence of a financial crisis is central bank lending to fi-
nancial institutions. One might expect central bank lending to banks to increase during a
banking crisis as banks need to draw on short-term credit lines. In both countries, Hungary16
and Poland, however, central bank lending to the non-government sector declined throughout
most of the time. 2°
III. Policies to Prevent the Crisis
1. Restoring Solvency
As regards policy options for solving the stock problem, Sundararajan and Balino
[1991, p. 35] in their study of banking crises conclude that a reform package should (i) make
the losses transparent, (ii) use technical, financial, and personal resources most efficiently
when recovering loans, liquidating assets, and restructuring firms, and (iii) ensure that equity-
holders absorb losses to the greatest possible extent. In addition, they deem it essential for the
success of a restructuring-cum-recapitalization program that (iv) the old management is being
replaced. For the case of Eastern Europe, this requirement is closely related to the privatiza-
tion of banks. As a further crucial element that determines over the success of a reform pro-
gram, it should be added that (v) the scope for moral hazard problems should be minimized,
i.e. banks and enterprises should have no incentive to gamble on future bail outs. Finally, (vi)
solvency should be restored in a non-inflationary way which excludes central bank lending to
troubled banks from the list of options.
2
1
A policy of widening bank margins which allows banks to gradually recapitalize
themselves through monopolistic profits cannot hold firm against the above criteria. Such a
policy would allow banks to recover loan losses through a managed interest rate adjustment
2
2
[Mathieson, 1980], combined with a protection of market shares of the incumbent banks. This
is neither transparent because it leaves the bad loans on the balance sheets, nor does it reduce
the wealth position of equity holders. The policy has severe negative implications for the
competitive structure of the banking system and for the efficiency of resource allocation be-
cause high interest rate spreads discourage both, investment and savings. As an alternative to
gradual recapitalization, the replacement of bank loans by government bonds which have
been placed on the private capital market seems a suitable instrument for recapitalization
20 See appendix for a graphical exposition of these findings. Unfortunately, comparable data
for the Czech Republic has not been available, and the Estonian Central Bank typically
does not perform any lending activities.
2
1 Calvo and Kumar [1994] formalize this argument in a simple cash-in-advance model in
which enterprises finance working capital through bank loans.
2
2 In other words, taxation of deposits as a means to cope with the bad debt problem is not a
viable option for policy makers as it may drive financial savings out of the country.
Equally inappropriate would be a policy which deliberately aims at inflating the economy
in order to reduce the real value of non-performing loans. As a matter of fact, the real
value of old debt was sharply reduced in Poland, as it is now the case in Russia. However,
•apart form the adverse effects that high inflation rates have on the real economy, the
structural problem underlying the accumulation of bad assets is not solved in this way.17
[Begg/Portes, 1993; Schmieding/Buch, 1992; Hinds, 1991]. With such a policy, there is no
case for protecting the wealth of equity holders of an already privatized bank
2
3 because, in
contrast to depositors, the owners of a bank should have had at least some control over
management behavior. A bail-out of owners may thus seriously impair their incentives to
effectively monitor and constrain management behavior in the future. It thus remains to
discuss the costs of a recapitalization program to the government.
The exchange of debt owed by state-owned enterprises into government debt is
nothing more but an arithmetic calculation entirely taking place within the state sector. The
discounted present value of the state sector's obligations remains unaffected by such a swap of
bad loans for government bonds. This argument is strengthened even further if one considers
that the socialist state typically provided an implicit deposit insurance. Hence, if enterprises
cannot repay their debt, the government may intervene anyhow to make its guarantee explicit.
Because the replacement of unsafe assets on the balance sheets of banks by safe government
securities entails a shift of obligations of the state-sector over time, recapitalization has im-
mediate implications for the narrowly defined budget due to the debt servicing requirements
[Calvo/Kumar, 1994, p. 22]. State-sector's liabilities which have previously been part of the
quasi-fiscal deficit are now included in the fiscal deficit. The immediate impact of a recapi-
talization program is thus an increase in the federal deficit which is only gradually declining
as potential privatization revenues are realized. In addition, effective banking sector reform
may reveal that the bulk of the profits that banks report are nothing more but paper profits.
Hence, the government may loose a substantial amount of profit tax revenue when effectively
starting to restructure banks [Gomulka, 1993, p. 15]. In many Eastern European countries, a
solution to the stock problem has thus been rejected or delayed because of its supposed costs
to the budget.
The calculations below show that the budgetary costs of recapitalization programs are
indeed non-trivial [Table 2]. It has been assumed that the government takes over all non-per-
forming loans or all loans to state-owned enterprises, respectively, and pays the domestic
market-interest rate on these loans to the banks. Hence, the calculations give the interest costs
of a recapitalization program only; the repayment of the principal in the future is neglected.
2
4
In order to obtain a complete estimate of the net costs of recapitalization, one would have to
2
3 Note that to the extent that banks are still state-owned the protection of share-holders
wealth through the state is meaningless.
2
4 For similar calculations see Begg and Portes [1993] and Thorne [1993]. Levine and Scott
[1992], in contrast, calculate the costs of recapitalization for the widely defined
government budget as the costs arising from the take-over of that debt that presumingly
could have been served by the enterprise sector. Note, however, that the take-over of this
debt should raise the privatization revenue from the enterprise by an equal amount, leaving
the net financing requirement for the government unaffected.18
deduct privatization revenues for the sale of banks and enterprises.
2
5 The calculations reveal
that the potential costs of bank recapitalization have, at least initially, been lowest in the
Czech Republic and in Estonia, which, at the same time, reported also the lowest budget
deficits and could thus afford a recapitalization program best. It is also evident that the post-
ponement of recapitalization as in the case of Hungary contributed to rising costs of such pro-
gram, at least if the numbers for 1991 and 1992 are compared. The decline in the interest
costs between 1992 and 1993 is primarily the result of falling interest rates and a rise in GDP
rather than of a reduction in bad debt. In Poland, the costs of a recapitalization program as a
percentage of GDP declined throughout the 1991-1993-period. This is primarily effect of a
growing GDP and of a relatively small (official) financial sector. The Polish economy seems
thus to grow out of the problem, albeit at the cost of a low degree of bank-based financial in-
termediation.
Table 2: - Potential Interest Costs of Bank Recapitalization, 1991 -1993.































Upper Value: All loans to state enterprises taken over at market interest rates.
Lower Value: All non-performing loans being taken over.
In Brackets: budget deficits in percent of GDP ( + = surplus, - = deficit)
a) No data on loans to state-enterprises available; effect of loan consolidation not considered.
Sources: Various issues of CNB, Eesti Pank, NBH, NBP, Planecon; own calculations.
With respect to the specific design of a recapitalization program, three different
questions have to be answered.
2(* First, it has to be decided whether all loans to state enter-
2
5 Due to different privatization methods employed in the emerging market economies and
the lack of information on actual privatization revenues, these estimates are hard to obtain.
The experience of Eastern Germany, however, gives an idea of how costly recapitalization
remains even if privatization revenues are included. In Eastern Germany, the privatization
agency "Treuhandanstalt" has taken over all old debt of state-owned enterprises and
guaranteed its repayment. Hence, firms were privatized without any old debt on their
books. The same held true for banks. Yet, in April 1994, the Treuhandanstalt reported
cumulative costs of bank recapitalization of 95 Billion D-Mark whereas privatization
revenues amounted only to 28.3 Billion D-Mark, or one third [Deutsche Bundesbank,
Monatsbericht, April 1994, pp. 22].
2
6 For a slightly different classification see Saunders/Sommaravia [1993].19
prises that the state-owned commercial banks inherited upon their separation from the former
monobank or only those which effectively turned out non-performing should be covered by
the program. Secondly, a centralized or decentralized solution to the selection and admini-
stration of loans can be chosen. Thirdly, the program may target the asset side of the bank's
balance sheet by replacing bad debt by interest-bearing government bonds or the liabilities'
side. If the latter approach is taken, non-performing loans remain on the balance sheet of the
bank. The bank may then decide to write off the loans against freshly injected equity.
Case-by-case vs. wholesale: While there is wide-spread agreement in the literature
that banks should be recapitalized for the loans that they inherited from the past, it needs to be
decided whether only those loans that turned out non-performing should be replaced case-by-
case [Hinds 1991, Brainard 1991] or, alternatively, whether all loans to state enterprises
should be included [Schmieding/Buch 1992, Levine/Scott, 1992], As the case-by-case solu-
tion requires a substantial amount of human resource input and may thus be rather time con-
suming, a wholesale solution seems preferable at least at the beginning of the reform process
[Schmieding/Buch 1992]. Accounting procedures and banking regulations are too weak at
this time to allow a reliable assessment of the quality of loans. In order to achieve a clear cut
with the past, to minimize the scope for bargaining over which loans to include as well as to
reduce the scope for moral hazard behavior of banks after the recapitalization, and to signal
the clear determination of the government to carry on with banking reform, an immediate
whole-sale write off seems thus the preferable solution. This write-off should be done imme-
diately at the time of banking reform in order to enhance government credibility
[Levine/Scott, 1992]. A delayed recapitalization would increase the concentration of risk on
the balance sheets of banks [Perotti, 1993] and may thus make a future bail-out more likely.
Banks may actually gamble on this possibility and thus render any initial announcement not
to bail them out time inconsistent. The arguments for a whole-sale debt write off of loans to
state-owned enterprises become, however, weaker over time if bank recapitalization has al-
ready been delayed and if most of the lending to state-owned enterprises has taken place in a
reformed financial system.
2
7 In such a situation, a whole-sale write off might send the wrong
signals to bank and promote moral hazard behavior in the future. In addition, banks may in
the meantime already have learned about the quality of their loan portfolio as accounting pro-
cedures are being adopted to market-based standards and as Western auditing firms have
analyzed the balance sheets. A case-by-case approach therefore become feasible.
2**
2
7 It could be argued that this is a scenario in which no recapitalization should take place.
However, as a lack of earlier recapitalization efforts may have been conducive to further
bad loan accumulation, the same arguments as for early recapitalization can be applied.
2
8 This applies in particular to those states which have already introduced Western-type
regulations such as, with modifications, the economies analyzed in this paper.20
Centralized vs. decentralized: If a case-by-case approach is chosen, it must be decided
whether the bank itself (decentralized) or the government (centralized) decides which loans
are to be replaced, i.e. which of the two is better suited to assess the value of a loan. One way
to overcome this information problem is to allow banks to sell their loan portfolios on the
market, as has recently been proposed by several authors [Mizsei, 1994; Perotti, 1994], and to
recapitalize them by the amount necessary to restore solvency. While this is certainly the
most market^based solution, it also puts substantial demands on the efficiency of secondary
markets. Especially at the beginning of the transformation process, when the problem of in-
herited bad debt is most pressing and when markets are the least developed, market-based
debt reduction may not be feasible. As, however, the case-by-case solution has been proposed
as a strategy that becomes more favorable over time, market-based debt reduction seems a vi-
able strategy to implement the case-by-case solution.
There remains the general question whether the recapitalization of banks should go
hand-in-hand with a write-off of debt to firms. Notwithstanding the disciplining effects that
debt can have on the behavior of firms, there is a good argument for reducing the inherited
debt of firms early in the transformation process. This cancellation of old loans, which have
been granted at socialist times, may actually serve to speed up the privatization of firms.
There is, however, no point in relieving firms off their burden of newly accumulated bad debt
as such a debt write-off would promote moral hazard. To the extent that loans to firms are not
completely cancelled, the administration of the loans may again be organized on a centralized
or decentralized basis. One advantage of centralized loan administration through a govern-
mental agency is that it takes any obligation to administer old loans off the banks. Banks can
thus concentrate their resources on the selection and administration of new clients. The need
for qualified personal that is able to undertake loan workouts may, in addition, be less a con-
straint under a centralized approach than under a decentralized approach. Also, enterprise and
banking reform can be separated by choosing a centralized approach, and bank privatization
may become more independent of progress being made with restructuring the enterprise sec-
tor. However, it can be questioned whether government agencies have superior qualities in
loan administration than banks [Gomulka, 1993; Mizsei, 1994] and whether the government
can successfully withstand demands for subsidies for the firms that it has under its admini-
stration. Furthermore, any learning potential for the bank that may be connected with the
administration of old loans is foregone upon choosing a centralized approach. It could well be
argued that banks already have better information on their customers, and that they may have
a greater potential and interest to acquire this information than government agencies. Hence,
in order to reduce the potential for unsound lending while yet exploiting the information basis
of the bank, the administration of the loans could be assigned to the bank while prohibiting
the bank from extending any new loans to the firms covered by the loan work-out.21
Asset vs. liabilities side: While most recommendations for banking reform favour the
replacement of non-performing loans by government bonds (equalization claims)
[Begg/Portes, 1993; Schmieding/Buch, 1992], recapitalization might as well target the li-
abilities' side of the bank's balance sheet. In the latter case, in order to strengthen the equity
base of the bank, the government would have to inject fresh equity. The advantage of the as-
set-side approach, i.e. of a swap of loans for bonds, is that it can be done quickly and in a
whole-sale manner. The liabilities-side approach, in contrast, would give banks leeway in
deciding over which loan to write off, it is thus more closely related to a decentralized pro-
gram. The objections raised against a decentralized approach hold therefore as well. Two
further concerns against the injection of new equity must be mentioned. First, the injection of
new equity, at least temporarily, raises the government's stake in the banking system. Even if
the government was committed to divest its newly acquired shares soon, this commitment
may not be credible. Bank recapitalization would thus have the undesirable outcome to work
against the ultimate goal of bank privatization. Secondly, the mere injection of equity poten-
tially restores the solvency of banks but it would leave the old, non-performing loans on the
balance sheets. Maintaining their residual claims on enterprises, the banks may thus have an
incentive to embark in a gambling game, hoping to recover some of the individual loan's
losses. In order to avoid distress lending and to speed up bank privatization, approaches that
target the asset side should thus be strictly preferred over those that inject new equity.
2. Containing the Flow of Bad Debt
Parallel to the implementation of a recapitalization scheme, measures should be
launched that have the potential to prevent a recurrence of a non-performing loans problem,
i.e. to maintain solvency. These measures are necessary because banks may not fully take ac-
count of lending risks for two reasons. First, as long as banks are state-owned, they may fol-
low a politically motivated lending strategy and operate under soft budget constraints.
2
9
These banks would not take lending risks and the impact of potential losses on credits into ac-
count when deciding over the structure of their assets. This would give a rationale for restric-
tions to be imposed on the lending activities of state-owned banks forcing them to behave in a
more risk-cautious manner. A second rationale for the introduction of prudential regulations
stems from the observation that information may be asymmetrically distributed between the
enterprise and the bank as well as between the bank and its depositors. This means that either
the bank cannot observe the riskiness of the enterprise's investment and thus not adjust its
2
9 However, if safeguards against a continuing flow problem cannot be introduced, bank
recapitalization may have to be postponed in order to avoid that banks use their additional
leeway to support ailing enterprises [OECD, 1993b, p. 173].22
balance sheet structure accordingly or that the depositor's cannot observe the riskiness of the
bank's loan portfolio and thus not demand the appropriate risk premium.
A first crucial step towards the embankment of the flow problem of non-performing
loans is the abolition of directed credit programs. Under these programs, commercial banks
are used as agents of the government that channel loans to pre-determined enterprises. Typi-
cally, directed credits are granted under below-market interest rates. The channel banks have
no influence on the selection of enterprises, they effectively continue to operate just like
banks in the socialist system. The presence of directed credit programs therefore delays the
transition to market-based, two-tier financial systems and lays the foundation for a bad debt
problem in the future. '
After the abolition of such directed credit programs, the most effective way to ensure
a risk-based allocation of financial resources is the privatization of banks and the imposition
of an effective bankruptcy threat on financial firms. As long as banks remain state-owned and
are thus under suspicion to pursue goals other than profit maximization, however, ceilings
should be imposed on the maximum exposure of state-owned banks to the socialized enter-
prise sector [Begg/Portes, 1993; Schmieding/Buch, 1992; Hinds, 1993]. State-owned enter-
prises with liquidity needs in excess of these limits could then turn to private banks. This
measures would incidentally support private banks in their acquisition of market shares. The
need to impose credit ceilings on the lending of state-owned banks is in particular urgent if
bad loans have not yet been removed from the balance sheets. In such situation, distress
lending is likely to occur. Credit limits would thus also have to be imposed on privatized
banks that have not yet been relieved off non-performing loans to state-owned enterprises.
However, as banks are seldom privatized while having bad loans on their balance sheets, this
case is only of minor empirical importance.
On a microeconomic level, the introduction of tighter banking regulations and their
enforcement through a banking supervision agency are means to condemn risky lending be-
havior of banks [Baltensperger/Dermine, 1992]. In the presence of asymmetric information,
prudential regulations may be imposed on banks that require them to hold a certain amount of
equity or equity-reserves in proportion to their (risk-weighted) assets (capital-asset-require-
ments), that limit bank's exposures to single clients, or that impose other constraints on the
lending behavior of banks. In the extreme case, banks may be required to hold deposits of the
population in safe assets such as, for example, government securities only (narrow bank ap-
proach). The appropriateness of each of these measures hinges on the exactness with which
the underlying market failures can be identified and on the information of the supervisory
agency. For the emerging market economies, the case can be made for a rather pragmatic ad-
aptation of banking regulations to Western standards [Schmieding, 1992, Schmieding/Buch,
1992]> This would safe scarce human resources that would otherwise have to be employed to23
draw up programs specific for Eastern Europe. In addition, the implementation of Western
type banking regulations may foster the market entry of Western banks. Nevertheless, the
need remains to adjust Western banking regulations to the specific circumstances of the
economies in transition. This applies, for example, to the classification of'financial assets re-
garding their liquidity characteristics as secondary markets are functioning less smoothly than
in developed market economies.
Tirole [1994], based on a joint paper with Dewatripont [1993], argues that one way to
contain the flow problem of bad debt is to limit shareholder control in case that the bank is
performing poorly. In such a situation, shareholders whose expected return is convex, tend to
take on more risk than optimal. Hence, in bad states of the world, i.e. if the capital-asset-ratio
falls below a certain threshold level, depositors should gain control. He shows, in addition,
that the standard capital-asset or Cooke-ratio meets the requirements which are imposed on
regulations from the viewpoint of the theory of optimal control. As depositors are typically
dispersed and thus not able to easily coordinate their interests, banking regulators may bundle
depositors' interests, take over control, and prevent excessive risk taking.
3^
Next to the introduction and enforcement of prudential regulations, the establishment
of an explicit deposit insurance system is essential for the stability of the financial system. In
the socialist financial system and, at least partially also in the reformed system, the state has
been providing an implicit guarantee for the safety of deposits held with state-owned banks.
This commitment of the government may incidentally be one major reason why depositors
keep their trust in domestic banks despite the mounting bad debt problems. It also may cause
substantial costs in the future . In the medium- to long-run, the government should therefore
withdraw its obligation to protect depositors' wealth. Such a move could actually follow the
implementation of a recapitalization program, after which deposit insurance may be or-
ganized on a private basis.
3
1
The results of this section can be summarized as follows. First, the first-best approach
to solving the problem of non-performing loans is to replace all inherited loans to state-owned
enterprises by government securities at the beginning of the transformation process. Com-
bined with the immediate privatization of banks and the implementation of tight banking
regulations and, possibly, credit ceilings this approach minimizes the costs of a recapitaliza-
tion program because the scope for distress lending is minimized. Secondly, if the enforce-
ment of this first-best solution has been delayed and if credit assessment procedures have
been improved in the meantime, a case-by-case solution, covering non-performing loans only
30 For a discussion on the optimality of different regulatory regimes, i.e. private vs. state-
owned banking supervision see Dewatripont/Tirole [1993].
3
1 See Schmieding/Buch [1992] on a more lengthy discussion of this subject.24
can be implemented. Thirdly, if old loans to enterprises are not written off, a decentralized
approach to the administration of these loans seems superior to a centralized approach if
banks have already acquired some skills in loan monitoring. This, however should not hamper






Out of the three early reform states of Eastern Europe, former Czechoslovakia tackled
the problem of inherited non-performing loans on the balance sheet of banks rather early in
the reform process. The implementation of such measures was in particular urgent as, in con-
trast to Poland or Estonia, the real value of old loans was not eroded through high inflation
rates [Hrncir, 1993, p. 308].
3
3 Hence, in March 1991, the Consolidation Bank was founded to
which 110 billion Krowns in so-called Perpetual Inventory Credits were transferred. These
loans had been granted to enterprises under central planning in order to finance inventories at
low interest rates and under often unlimited maturities. In October 1991, the banks were re-
capitalized for less than 50 percent of the amount of loans transferred through government
bonds at the amount of 50 billion Krowns or 6.8 (9.8) percent of total credits (credits to state-
owned enterprises). 12 billion Krowns were used to increase the banks' capital base, against
the remainder could the banks write off loans. Hence, the Czechoslovakian authorities used a
combined asset- and liabilities-side approach. In a centralized decision making process, the
allocation of bonds across banks was decided.
3
4
With respect to the flow problem of bad debt, the Czech Republic opted for a gradual
approach as far as the implementation of prudential regulations is concerned. Only by the end
of 1996 do banks which were founded prior to 1990 have to comply with the 8 percent capi-
tal-asset-ratio. Rules for maximum exposure and large credit risks exist, but full compliance
is only required by the end of 1995. The net credit exposure of a bank to one client, for
example, should not exceed 40 percent of the bank's capital by the end of 1993 and 25 percent
by the end of 1995. In 1994, the Czech National Bank finally began to enforce the bankruptcy
3
2 ,A summary of this section is given in Table 4 in the appendix.
3
3 After the liberalization of prices, consumer price inflation reached only 56.7 percent
(1991) in the Czech Republic. In Poland, prices increased by 585.8 percent (1990), in
Estonia even by 1069.3 percent (1992). Only in Hungary did consumer price inflation not
' rise sharply. [Planecon, 1993, 1994]
3
4 Hrncir [1993] remarks that the Consolidation Bank has later on also taken loans off the
commercial banks on a case-by-case basis. However, there is no detailed information on
these transactions available. In addition, two debt clearing operation for enterprises have
been conducted by the National Property Fund in 1993 [WIIW, 1994, p. 26].25
law against commercial banks. The activities of three banks which assets accounted for 2.7
percent of those of the ten largest banks at the end of March 1994 were suspended,
3
5 and
further banks are under tight scrutiny of the banking supervision. In, the context of these
measures, an amendment to the Czech banking law, including a private-deposit insurance,
improved provisioning requirements, and enhanced powers of banking : supervision was
adopted in July 1994 [The Economist, 1994]. In addition to these measures, the
Czechoslovakian authorities used credit ceilings as an instrument of monetary policy until
autumn 1992. These ceilings limited the amount of loans that the large, state-owned banks
could grant to enterprises and may thus have served to contain the flow of bad debt. Finally,
the Czech Republic has made great progress with the privatization of banks. However, the
state continues to hold controlling stakes even in those banks which were privatized, in the
voucher privatization.
In summary, the Czech Republic tried to solve the stock prior to the flow problem. By
relieving banks off their burden of inherited non-performing loans early on, the way for
financing new, private enterprises was smoothed. In addition to the implementation of credit
ceilings, this is one reason why the share of private sector credit in total credit surpassed this
sector's contribution to GDP earlier than in Hungary or Poland [Buch et al., 1994]. However,
banking distress remains a problem also in the Czech Republic. The gradual implementation
of prudential regulations may have induced state-owned banks to engage into risky lending
behavior. New, private banks, which already have to comply with the stricter rules may not
have been supervised properly as evidenced by the high share of non-performing loans in the
private sector. As in other reform states, accounting procedures in the Czech Republic, at
least until recently, did not meet with the requirements of an advanced market-type system.
3
6
Hrncir [1993] even notes that the incomplete recapitalization of banks implies the risk of the
recapitalization to have to be repeated. However, the fact that the first recapitalization can be
justified as a non-recurring event because it dealt only with the immediate legacies of the
past, this danger may be less pronounced than in Hungary or Poland, as will be shown below.
3
5 More specifically, one bank was taken over by the Czech Savings Bank, one discontinued
its activities, and one is actually undergoing bankruptcy procedures.
3
6 The largest Czech bank, Komercni Banka was, according to international accounting
standards, running losses in 1992. According to Czech standards, the bank was profitable
[Handelsblatt, 30.6.1994]. According to unofficial sources, these discrepancies had largely
been eliminated in 1993. .'..•;•••26
Estonia
Perhaps the most risk-prone strategy of dealing with the banking crisis has been
adopted by Estonia.
3
7 Shortly after the Estonian currency reform of June 1992^8, three com-
mercial banks became insolvent and were subjected to moratoria by the Central Bank. The
banking crises was in fact a result of the stabilization phase after the introduction of the
Krown. Insolvent banks quickly became illiquid as their refinancing opportunities with the
Central Bank dried out and as profit opportunities from foreign exchange operations became
more limited [Hansson, 1994, p. 9]. In November 1992, when the banking crises was in-
evitable, there was a payments backlog in the order of magnitude of about 19 percent of total
bank lending [IMF, 1993, p. 19]. The reasons for these bank insolvencies were at least two-
fold. In one case, the poor quality of the loans portfolio was primarily the result of asset mis-
management. This bank was closed and depositors received only their fare share out of the
revenue from selling the bank's assets which is estimated to amount to 50 percent of the face
value o£the claims [Hansson, 1994, p. 12]. The other two banks were insolvent because they
held their assets with accounts of the Russian Foreign Trade Bank which had become
insolvent-. These banks were merged and recapitalized through the government and the
Central Bank by an overall amount of 400 Million Estonian Krowns. For this purpose, the
Estonian government issued bonds at the amount of 300 Million Krowns which were used to
replenish the new bank's capital (43 Million) and to buy the bank's claims on the Russian
Foreign Trade Bank [North Estonian Bank, 1993]. Deposits by firms and the population with
that Russian bank were transferred to a newly created VEB-fund, which is under the control
of the Central Bank and of the government. These accounts, which are most likely to be
worthless, still accounted for 15 percent of the deposits of the whole banking system at the
end of 1993. These deposits, for which the VEB fund issued certificates of deposits, are not
covered by any official guarantee. In the context of the Estonian banking crisis, 10 further
banks were merged, 8 lost their licenzes, and two more banks were closed without depositors
being bailed out [Hansson, 1994, p. 1]. Accordingly, the number of banks in Estonia was re-
duced from 42 at the end of 1992 to 20 at the end of 1993. Deposits are generally not insured
through the government or the Central Bank. One exception to this rule is the Estonian Sa-
vings Bank which private deposits are fully insured by the Central Bank since the monetary
reform. In exchange for this guarantee, however, the Savings Bank was subjected to a 100
percent reserve requirement for its deposits until restructuring and management changes of
the bank were completed [Ross, 1993, p. 42].
Together with the revoking of banking licenses and the recapitalization of two banks,
stricter banking regulations and reporting requirements were implemented at the beginning of
1993. These changes include the requirement of a higher capital base for commercial banks,
•37; The information in this paragraph is based on various issues of the quarterly Bulletin of
i!Eesti Pank as well as on Sutt [1994].
38 For a detailed account of the Estonian monetary reform and the functioning of its currency
board system see Bennett [1992], Lainela [1992], and Buch [1993].27
the maintenance of a 8 percent risk-weighted capital-asset ratio, rules on maximum risk expo-
sure for both, the bank's client as well as for the bank. In addition, banks were subjected to
minimum reserve requirements of 10 percent.for all their accounts. Compliance with these ru-
les is checked by the banking supervision department of the Central Bank. Further amend-
ments to the Estonian banking law are currently under the review of the Estonian parliament.
They intend to bring Estonian rules closer to international standards and, among others, to in-
troduce legislative measures against money laundering.
3
9 In addition to the introduction of
prudential regulations that aim at improving the solvency of Estonian bank, the Central Bank
has undertaken efforts to improve the liquidity position of banks. The modified currency
board system which was established in Estonia does allow the Central Bank to provide only a
limited lender-of-last-resort facility [Hansson/Sachs, 1994] by lending its excess reserves to
troubled banks. The Central Bank does not offer liquidity assistance on a regular basis
through a discount window facility. For this reason, the operation of an inter-bank money
market is of crucial importance for maintaining the liquidity of Estonian banks. Hence, in
June 1993, the Central Bank started to auction off certificates of deposits (CD's). Commercial
banks can buy these certificates against any excess balances that they hold on the accounts
with the Central Bank. In response to this issuance of CD's, money market turn-over has
increased substantially to a monthly turnover of 850 million Estonian Krowns in February
1994, which is equivalent to 13 percent of commercial banks' assets [Eesti Pank, 1994:2].
The Estonian approach to dealing with the banking crisis resembles most closely the
ideal approach outlined above. Losses were made transparent, the crisis was solved in a
timely manner, hence saving scarce resources, and owners lost their equity stakes. Because
the government and the Central Bank refrained from bailing out banks which losses were due
to management failure, moral hazard problems are unlikely to occur. In addition, the tight
monetary policy of the Estonian Central Bank seems to be credible as it led to lower real in-
terest rates in Estonia as compared to the other Baltic states [Hansson/Sachs, 1994]. One im-
mediate effect of the crisis, however, has been a decline in the money multiplier and, hence, a
tendency towards disintermediation of the financial system. The crucial question for the fu-
ture success of the Estonian strategy is whether banks can resume their role to finance in-
vestment without putting the stability of the financial system at risk. Apart from the esta-
blishment of a functioning money market, the introduction of a deposit insurance system is of
crucial importance in this regard. It is planned to establish such a system on a completely pri-
vate basis. While this approach minimizes the incentives of banks to gamble on public bail-
outs it does not yet solve problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance mar-
kets as such [Rothschild/Stiglitz, 1976]. As these problems are likely to impede the evolution
of an efficient privately-run insurance system, Estonia may allow its banks to join a foreign
3
9 The draft of the new banking law foresees compliance with the banking standards of the
European Union by the year 2000 [Hansson, 1994, p. 7].28
deposit insurance system. The provision of access to deposit insurance systems could be an
effective opportunity for the West to enhance the potential for financial stability in the East.
4^
In addition, domestic banking supervision may make > information on the quality of banks
available to the general public.
Hungary
The Hungarian government relied on a gradual approach to bank recapitalization and
balance sheet restructuring up to 1992. Banks were supposed to recapitalize themselves
through high interest rate spreads and, at the same time, to provide tax revenues to the go-
vernment. Only in 1991 did the government extend guarantees to the banks covering loans of
10.5 billion Forint [OECD, 1993, p. 65]. This measure could, however, offer only minor
relief to^the commercial banks as only 1 percent of their non-governmental loans or 12
percent of the classified debt was covered. Despite these rather ineffective efforts at solving
the stock problem of bad debt, the Hungarian authorities exposed the banks to quite
substantial legislative changes aimed at solving the flow problem. In 1992, prudential
regulations for banks were tightened (1.12.1991), new accounting and reporting requirements
were introduced, and the bankruptcy law became effective (1.1.1992) [Abel/Bonin, 1994]. As
a consequence of these institutional changes, the true amount of financial distress was
revealed, the financial situation of banks worsened dramatically, and many of them reported
negative net-worth.
4
1 Banks virtually stopped any new lending to the business sector and
restructured their asset portfolios towards holding more safe assets such as loans to the
government.
4
2 Hence, the government was forced to implement measures which directly
targeted the stock problem with the loan consolidation programs of 1992 and 1993.
The. original intention of the loan consolidation program was to avoid a major finan-
cial crises, to strengthen the capital base of banks, and to prepare them for privatization. All
loans which had been granted prior to November 1992 to borrowers undergoing liquidation
were covered by the program.
4-* By January 1993, commercial banks which were either state-
owned or, upon approval of the Ministry of Finance, which had a capital-asset ratio below
7.25 percent could submit parts of their loan portfolios to be bought by a state-owned De-
velopment and Investment Corporation at centrally determined prices. The banks received
(i) 50 percent of the face value of loans granted prior to December 1991, (ii) 80 percent for
40 The same recommendation applies to the West to grant access to inter-bank money market
which would tend to mitigate liquidity risks for Estonian banks.
4
1 Abel and Bonin [1994] report that three of the four largest banks were insolvent according
to international accounting procedures at this time.
4
2 Although nominal credit expanded slightly in 1992, these increases primarily reflect
capitalized interest [Calvo/Kumar, 1994, p. 24].
43 Consumer credits, housing loans, and inter-bank loans were not covered [Csaki, 1993,
Pp.16]29
the loans granted between January and September 1992, and (iii) 100 percent for loans to
those state-owned enterprises which were selected by the State Privatization Agency [OECD,
1993, p. 66]. In March 1993, upon a case-by-case examination through the Ministry of
Finance, recapitalization of the banks commenced. In return for 102.6 billion Forint of non-
performing loans - most of it having been contracted between 1990 and 1992 [Szanyi, 1993,
p. 3] -,the banks received 79.4 billion Forint in Consolidation Bonds [Csaki, 1994, p. 17].
These bonds have a maturity of 20 years and yield the treasury bill rate if they replace the
principal of a loan and of 50 percent of that rate if they replace interest arrears, respectively.
In addition, the banks had to pay a participation fee of up to 50 percent of the interest revenue
they received from the bonds. Because the participation fee lowered the effective value of the
bonds, banks were initially recapitalized only for 30 percent of their bad loans. Hence, the fee
and the interest differential were dropped in June 1992 [Abel/Bonin, 1994]. Altogether, the
three banks which had inherited the corporate sector loan portfolios of the monobank
4
4
contributed about one third of all loans to the first loan consolidation program, which is
roughly equivalent to their share in commercial banks' assets [Table 3].
Overall, the first loan consolidation program had little impact on the behavior of
banks and enterprises as well as on the quality of the banks' loan portfolios. At the end of
1993, banks reported the same amount of non-performing loans as one year earlier while
overall credit expansion had been a modest 6.38 percent between January and November
1993. Because many banks still had a negative net worth, the government decided to buy
equity issued by the banks, thus gradually raising their capital-asset-ratio from zero percent
by the end of 1993 to 4 percent by May 1994 and, finally, to the full 8 percent. The purchase
of the equity shares was financed through the sale of government bonds, but for the last stage
of this program, financial support from the World Bank is envisaged. The total costs of the
Hungarian bank consolidation programs are estimated at 296 billion Forint [NZZ,





4 These are the Budapest Bank, The Hungarian Credit Bank, and the Commercial and Credit
Bank [OECD, 1993, p. 56].
4
5 These calculations are made at an interest rate on treasury bills of 17 percent. As an
additional step towards the strengthening of the domestic' banking system, Hungary
established guidelines for a deposit insurance system in June 1993. However, it remains
unclear to what extent the government and the Central Bank keep an implicit obligation to
support ailing financial institutions. For details see "Act on National Deposit Insurance
Fund", Ministry of Finance, Budapest, 1993.Table 3
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b) Amount of bonds received.
c) Full amount of loans submitted without deductions for lower face value of bonds out of a
total of 102.6 billion Forint.
Sources: Csaki [1993]; Planecon Business Report [1994]; NZZ [12.-13.6.1994]; The Banker
[July 1994]; own calculations.
The Hungarian bank consolidation schemes have, finally, achieved one of their main
goals that is to strengthen the. capital base of Hungarian banks. However, these achievements
have only come at substantial costs in terms of government credibility, efficiency of resource
allocation as well as costs to the budget:
— Because the recapitalization of banks was substantially delayed with respect to the crea-
tion of a two-tier banking system, resource mis-allocation continued for a substantial
, amount of time, and the privatization of banks was delayed. After the new prudential
regulations were introduced in 1992, banks virtually stopped credit expansion, and the
domestic financial sector lost part of its intermediary role.31
Recapitalization lacked, both, transparency as well as safeguards against moral hazard
problems. Because the initial program was not sufficiently encompassing and even needed
to be modified shortly after its implementation, banks could actually gamble on future
bail-outs and further increase their risk exposure. Moral hazard problems were also in-
herent in the program because (i) not only banks which inherited a stock of non-perform-
ing loans from the previous regime, (ii) not only loans to state-owned enterprises, and (iii)
not only loans which were granted in socialist times were covered by the program.
Mistakes were also made as regards the pricing of assets. First, the pricing was not left to
the market but prices were centrally determined. In addition, loans which were granted
prior to the introduction of new accounting requirements and prudential regulations were
bought at a lower discount than loans which were granted in 1992, i.e. at a time when the
new rules already applied and when banks may have had expectations about a future bail-
out. Poor management was thus rewarded.
In contrast to its original intention, the program raised the government's ownership stake
in the banking system rather than speeding up the privatization of banks. As government
officials are now becoming heavily involved in drawing up business plans for the recapi-
talized banks, banks may even have become more unattractive for outside investors.
Poland
In Poland, similar to the case of Hungary, no attempt was made until 1992 to deal
with the problem of non-performing loans on the balance sheets of banks.
4** Then* however,
the Law on the Financial Restructuring of Banks and Enterprises became effective in March
1993 which intends to solve the solvency problem of 11 state-owned banks and, at the same
time, to restructure indebted enterprises. Apart from those nine banks which inherited the
monobank's loan portfolios, the Savings Bank and the Bank for Agriculture were covered by
the program. The new law consisted of two main parts, the debt restructuring and the recapi-
talization of banks [Pietrzak, 1994, pp. 26]. As far as debt restructuring is concerned, assets
which were classified doubtful or low quality prior to June 1992 qualify for participation in
the scheme. Hence, as in Hungary, not only inherited non-performing loans are covered. Only
firms which are fully state-owned or in which the state holds more than 50 percent of the
shares are covered by the program [Pawlowicz, 1994, p. 44]. The qualifying assets must be
transferred to a special unit within the bank, and no new loans may be extended to the firms
in question. The newly created loan work-out departments have to analyze restructuring plans
and to start reorganization of the enterprises. During these conciliatory procedures, the debt
of the enterprise can be converted into equity shares, it may be sold on the market, or be
serviced. If no restructuring plan is submitted, the enterprise is forced into liquidation. Debt
4
6 For a detailed account of the Polish approach see Pawlowicz [1994] and OECD [1993].32
restructuring plans had to be worked out by the end of March 1994 when 131 agreements had
already been reached between banks and enterprises, and when banks had initiated additional
128 conciliatory procedures. Altogether 16 billion zloty or 3.7 percent of the non-govern-
mental credits at the end of 1993 were involved in these agreements, being submitted by
seven banks [Presseschau Ostwirtschaft, 1994, p. 13].
Bank recapitalization is, in principle, not directly tied to the handling of specific loans.
Rather, a total amount of 21 trillion zloty has been set aside which is being used for re-
plenishing the banks' capital base. These costs are not entirely born by the budget because in-
ternational financial sources could be tapped. Seven out of the nine banks which had been
carved out of the former monobank had received government bonds at the amount of 11 tril-
lion zloty by the end of 1993, intending to bring their capital-asset-ratios to 12 percent. This
amount of recapitalization is actually roughly equivalent to the amount of loans that the
banking system inherited from the former monobank system. It may, however, not suffice to
fully recapitalize the banks [Gomulka, 1993, p. 18]. This is one reason why the National
Bank of Poland offers special credit lines to support the program [Pawlowicz, 1994, p. 58].
This additional support makes the program less credible and opens the door for moral hazard
behavior on part of the banks. The other two banks out of the nine, which have been priva-
tized already, do not receive additional financial support and are to cover loans losses out of
their profits [Pietrzak, 1994, pp. 26]. The remaining 10 trillion zloty are used to recapitalize
the Savings and the Agricultural Bank.
While the Polish reform program also suffers from severe delays in implementation, it
yet avoids some pitfalls of the Hungarian model. First, as the selection of the participating
banks was made strictly on the basis of being successors of the monobank system, as the re-
capitalization amount is roughly equivalent to the amount of inherited loans, and as only
loans to state-owned enterprises are covered, moral hazard problems are somewhat less likely
to occur. Secondly, bank managers are given incentives to avoid risky lending because enter-
prises which are under conciliation cannot receive further loans and because managers re-
ceived stock options which can be executed upon bank privatization [Calvo/Kumar,
1994, p. 24]. As the timing of privatization depends on the quality of the banks' assets, the
executives have thus an incentive to improve portfolio quality. Thirdly, the program does not
arbitrarily assign prices for the debt but rather relies on market-based pricing. Finally, the
Polish approach utilizes the learning potential of banks. This makes the process of bank
restructuring more time-consuming than a centralized solution would but, at the same time,
does not relieve bank managers from the obligation to acknowledge past mistakes. In contrast
to Hungary, however, Poland has not yet adjusted its banking legislation to Western standards
[Pietrzak, 1994, p. 28], hence delaying effective solutions of the flow problem of bad debt.33
IV. Outlook
Despite mounting problems of non-performing loans, in their, commercial banking
systems, neither the Czech Republic nor Hungary or Poland, have,experienced major banking
failures. The reasons why banking distress has not yet led to banking crises are twofold. First,
the governments until recently provided implicit deposit insurance to the state-owned, banks.
Hence, depositors were ultimately expecting to be bailed out and had thus no incentive to
withdraw their deposits as a response to banks' solvency problems. This also, explains why
even technically insolvent banks were able to attract new deposits and thus to maintain their
liquidity. Secondly, central banks may at times have provided liquidity assistance even to in-
solvent banks although the data on central bank lending suggests that this has not been a
dominant source of liquidity. The introduction of explicit deposit insurance schemes and a
more discriminatory refinancing policy will inevitably increase the public perception of
banking risks. This may incidentally raise the currency-to-deposit ratios and make a bank run
more likely. A bail-out of the affected banks, however, is not a viable option because, in all
three countries, the problem of the inherited debt has been dealt with already.
4
7 A govern-
ment bail-out would thus cause substantial problems of moral hazard because it would reward
mis-management.
The policies that have been implemented with regard to solving the stock problem are
far from being uniform in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Two different strategies can
be distinguished. Former Czechoslovakia and Estonia, on the one hand, solved the stock
problem of non-performing loans at the beginning of financial sector reforms by recapi-
talizing or closing insolvent banks, respectively. After that, only Estonia implemented fairly
tight prudential regulations and seems thus far to have succeeded in keeping its banking sy-
stem stable. Both countries are more advanced in terms of privatization of their banks and as
regards financing the private sector than Hungary and Poland. The latter, on the other hand,
have relied on a more gradual approach and launched recapitalization program only at fairly
late stages of the reform process. This delay has substantially retarded bank privatization and
has, in fact, increased the scope for moral hazard behavior of banks awaiting future bail-outs.
One major reason for this moral hazard behavior of commercial banks is that it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to tell new and old bad debts apart as the reform process continues. Hun-
gary tried to tackle the flow problem prior to the stock problem which virtually served to dry
out funds to be lent to the enterprise sector while Poland took a more gradual stance in this
regard.
The implementation of an efficient banking supervision and of proper prudential
regulations remains of utmost importance also for the more advanced reform states of Eastern
Europe. As banks gain strength and expand their operations into new fields of business, they
4
7 Of course, this conclusion also holds for Estonia.34
may also adopt greater risks. Clear guidance should thus be given to banks regarding the col-
laterization of loans. Loan classification schemes should not only take account of the time
period for which a loan has not been serviced but also include the value of collateral into the
assessment of loan quality. This requires asset price behavior such as stock prices to be
watched closely by both, the banks and the banking supervisors. In addition, reporting re-
quirements should take off-balance sheet risks into account. Ultimately, however, even the
most effective banking supervision cannot make up for the failures that occurred in the bank
itself as regards lending decisions. Incentives should be clear enough for banks to appro-
priately manage risks in house by, most importantly, imposing an effective bankruptcy threat
on banks. Liquidity assistance should be granted to solvent but illiquid banks, using data
collected by the banking supervision to categorize banks
48, while insolvent banks should be
closed.
4
8 See Mishkin [1994] for a similar argument.35
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Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland




Krowns of Perpetual Inven-
tory Credits were transferred
to Consolidation Bank; banks
were recapitalized for 7 % (50
billion Krowns) of their loans
to the non-governmental sec-
tor in 1991
1993: Case-by-case: recapita-
lization of two banks at the
amount of 15 % of all bank
loans in January 1993
1987: recapitalization for
1.7 % of loans (replacement of
housing loans);
1987-1992: gradual recapitali-
zation through interest spreads
1992-1994: Case-by-case:
Loans that were non-perform-
ing at the end of 1992 quali-
fied for participation in first
loan consolidation scheme
which covered 4 % • (before
June 1993) and 12 % (Decem-






Banks decide which loans to
write off; maximum amount
of recapitalization 21 trillion
zloty; the deadline for the
submission of loans was
March 1993. Alternatives to
loan write-offs are pay-back
schemes, debt-equity swaps,




Bank administers loans and
might return performing loans
to banks
Centralized: banks to be re-





(MBF) administers loans but
decision which loans to submit
is made by the bank; MBF
contracts loans management
partially out to the banks
Decentralized: loan hospitals
of the commercial banks ad-
minister loans and decide
which ones to write off; twin-
ning agreements with Western
banks; bank managers receive
stock options that can be ex-
ercized upon privatization
which, in turn, depends on
quality of the loan portfolioCzech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland
Asset vs.
Liabilities Side
Asset and Liability: Banks
received 38 billion Krowns in
bonds issued by the
Consolidation Bank in
exchange for the loans; 12
billion Krowns were issued to
replenish banks' capital
Asset and Liability: Asset and Liability: Asset and Liability:
Newly merged bank was 1st consolidation scheme —> Government bonds are used
partially be recapitalized by loans were replaced by to replenish equity-base of
government bonds; in government bonds indexed to banks.
addition, the government Treasury rate
bought stock of the bank. This 2nd scheme -> government
purchase was financed by the buys equity of banks, financed
sale of government bonds. by bonds sales




1991-92: Credit limits for Limits on large exposures are
state-owned banks were the in place.
main instrument of monetary
policy up to October 92;
banking law forsees limits on
large exposure
Single credits may not exceed
25 % of the capital of the bank
or 50 million Forint
1990-92: attempt to imple-
ment credit ceilings (30 % of
all loans to private firms);
ceilings were set with respect
to total assets and unrelated to
bank's capital or deposit base;
single credit may not exceed




up to 1996: gradual 1993: banks have to write off
implementation of BIS- bad loans which are overdue
standards for more than 150 days against




new and independent banking
supervision
1991: Western auditors ana-
lyze Polish banks
1992: new accounting rules
for banksCzech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland
Bankruptcy Law 1993: gradual implementation 1992-93: closure of 3 banks 1992: implementation of 1991-1992:
of bankruptcy law for banks with liabilities of 30 % of the bankruptcy law for banks and ing closed
and enterprises money supply; licenzes of al- enterprises
1994: closure of 3 banks with together 20 banks have been 1993: three banks closed
about 2.7 percent of assets of revoked





up to 1994: Private deposits in No deposit insurance; private up to 1993: automatic insu- up to 1993: automatic insu-
state-owned banks fully insu- insurance is envisaged. ranee for state-owned banks ranee for state-owned banks
red by government. 1993: implementation of de- 1993: mandatory deposit in-




1993: bank privatization gradual increase of private end 1994: bank privatization Jj
through vouchers; state retains share-holdings; 67 % of banks' planned
controlling stakes capital was privately held in
mid-1994




commercial banks decide over
debt relief; by the end-1991:
debt relief of 22 Bio. granted
to enterprises to be privatized.




reports minor cases of debt
forgiveness granted to
enterprises at the time of their
sale; no systematic evidence
available.
Debt-equity-swaps are possi- Banks decide over debt relief;
ble but stakes cannot be kept debt-equity-swaps are possible
longer than 6 months if they
exceed maximum allowed in-
vestment level for banks; 13
large enterprises received
guarantees and debt forgive-
ness until March 1994; total
amount of 174 billion Forint
Sources: OECD [1994, 1993a, 1993b]; Schmieding/Buch [1992]; Eesti Pank, various issues ; Ministry of Economics (Estonia); Hansapank;
Planecon [1994b].Graph 1
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Indicators of Financial Crises
(1) Czech Republic. 1990-1993.3
a) Currency as a Share ofM2,1990-1993. [in percent]
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b) Money Multiplier
8,5 r—
12 1993:1 2 3 9 10 11 12
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(2) Estonia. 1992-1994.
a) Money Multiplier
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(4) Poland. 1990-1993.
a) Money Multiplier
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